Introduction and Security Trends

Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure or nothing.
—Helen Keller

Why should we be concerned about computer and network security? All you have to do is turn on the television or read the newspaper to find out about a variety of security problems that affect our nation and the world today. The danger to computers and networks may seem to pale in comparison to the threat of terrorist strikes, but in fact the average citizen is much more likely to be the target of an attack on their own personal computer, or a computer they use at their place of work, than they are to be the direct victim of a terrorist attack. This chapter will introduce you to a number of issues involved in securing your computers and networks from a variety of threats that may utilize any of a number of different attacks.

In this chapter, you will learn how to:
- List and discuss recent trends in computer security
- Describe simple steps to take to minimize the possibility of an attack on a system
- Describe various types of threats that exist for computers and networks
- Discuss recent computer crimes that have been committed
The Security Problem

Fifty years ago, few people had access to a computer system or network, so securing them was a relatively easy matter. If you could secure the building that these early, very large systems were housed in, you could secure the data and information they stored and processed. Now, personal computers are ubiquitous and portable, making them much more difficult to secure physically, and are often connected to the Internet, putting the data they contain at much greater risk of attack or theft. Similarly, the typical computer user today is not as technically sophisticated as the typical computer user 50 years ago. No longer are computers reserved for use by scientists and engineers; now, even children who are barely able to read can be taught to boot a computer and gain access to their own favorite games or educational software.

Fifty years ago companies did not conduct business across the Internet. Online banking and shopping were only dreams in science fiction stories. Today, however, millions of people perform online transactions every day. Companies rely on the Internet to operate and conduct business. Vast amounts of money are transferred via networks, in the form of either bank transactions or simple credit card purchases. Wherever there are vast amounts of money, there are those who will try to take advantage of the environment to conduct fraud or theft. There are many different ways to attack computers and networks to take advantage of what has made shopping, banking, investment, and leisure pursuits a simple matter of “dragging and clicking” for many people. Identity theft is so common today that most everyone knows somebody who’s been a victim of such a crime, if they haven’t been a victim themselves. This is just one type of criminal activity that can be conducted using the Internet. There are many others and all are on the rise.

Security Incidents

By examining some of the computer-related crimes that have been committed over the last 20 or so years, we can better understand the threats and security issues that surround our computer systems and networks. Electronic crime can take a number of different forms but the ones we will examine here fall into two basic categories: crimes in which the computer was the target, and incidents in which a computer was used to perpetrate the act (for example, there are many different ways to conduct bank fraud, one of which uses computers to access the records that banks process and maintain).

We will start our tour of computer crimes with the 1988 Internet worm (Morris worm), one of the first real Internet crime cases. Prior to 1988 criminal activity was chiefly centered on unauthorized access to computer systems and networks owned by the telephone company and companies which provided dial-up access for authorized users. Virus activity also existed prior to 1988, having started in the early 1980s.

The Morris Worm (November 1988)

Robert Morris, then a graduate student at Cornell University, released what has become known as the Internet worm (or the Morris worm). This was the first large-scale attack on the Internet, though it appears doubtful that
Morris actually intended that his creation cause the impact that it did at the time. The worm infected roughly 10 percent of the machines then connected to the Internet (which amounted to approximately 6000 infected machines) and caused an estimated $100 million in damage, though this number has been the subject of wide debate. The worm carried no malicious payload, the program being obviously a “work in progress,” but it did wreak havoc because it continually reinfects computer systems until they could no longer run any programs. The worm took advantage of known vulnerabilities in several programs to gain access to new hosts and then copied itself over. Morris was eventually convicted under Title 10 United States Code Section 1030 for releasing the worm and was sentenced to three years’ probation, a $10,000 fine, and 400 hours of community service.

Citibank and Vladimir Levin (June–October 1994)

Starting about June of 1994 and continuing until at least October of the same year, a number of bank transfers were made by Vladimir Levin of St. Petersburg, Russia. By the time he and his accomplices were caught, they had transferred an estimated $10 million. Eventually all but about $400,000 was recovered. Levin reportedly accomplished the break-ins by dialing into Citibank’s cash management system. This system allowed clients to initiate their own fund transfers to other banks. An estimated $50 billion was transferred daily during this period, so the amounts transferred by Levin were very small in comparison to the overall total on any given day. To avoid detection, he also conducted the transactions at night in Russia so that they coincided with normal business hours in New York. Levin was arrested in London in 1995 and, after fighting extradition for 30 months, eventually was turned over to U.S. authorities, was tried, and was sentenced to three years in jail. Four accomplices of Levin plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and received lesser sentences.

Kevin Mitnick (February 1995)

Kevin Mitnick’s computer activities occurred over a number of years during the 1980s and 1990s. He was arrested in February 1995 (not his first arrest on computer criminal charges) for federal offenses related to what the FBI described as a 2½-year computer hacking spree. He eventually pleaded guilty to four counts of wire fraud, two counts of computer fraud, and one count of illegally intercepting a wire communication and was sentenced to 46 months in jail. In the plea agreement, Mitnick admitted to having gained unauthorized access to a number of different computer systems belonging to companies such as Motorola, Novell, Fujitsu, and Sun Microsystems. He described using a number of different “tools” and techniques, including social engineering, sniffers, and cloned cellular telephones. Mitnick also admitted to having used stolen accounts at the University of Southern California to store proprietary software he had taken from various companies. He also admitted to stealing e-mails and impersonating employees of targeted companies in order to gain access to the software he was seeking.

Omega Engineering and Timothy Lloyd (July 1996)

On July 30, 1996, a software “time bomb” went off at Omega Engineering, a New Jersey–based manufacturer of high-tech measurement and control
instruments. Twenty days earlier, Timothy Lloyd, a computer network program designer, had been dismissed from the company after a period of growing tension between Lloyd and management at Omega. The program that ran on July 30 deleted all of the design and production programs for the company, severely damaging the small firm and forcing the layoff of 80 employees. The program was eventually traced back to Lloyd, who had left it in retaliation for his dismissal. In May of 2000, a federal judge sentenced Lloyd to 41 months in prison and ordered him to pay more than $2 million in restitution.

Worcester Airport and “Jester” (March 1997)
In March of 1997, airport services to the FAA control tower as well as the emergency services at the Worcester Airport and the community of Rutland, Massachusetts, were cut off for a period of six hours. This disruption occurred as a result of a series of commands sent by a teenage computer “hacker” who went by the name “Jester.” The individual had gained unauthorized access to the “loop carrier system” operated by NYNEX, a New England telephone company. Loop carrier systems are programmable remote computer systems used to integrate voice and data communications. Jester was eventually caught and ordered to pay restitution to the telephone company, as well as complete 250 hours of community service.

Solar Sunrise (February 1998)
In January of 1998, relations between Iraq and the United States again took a turn for the worse and it appeared as if the United States might take military action against Iraq. During this period of increased tension and military preparation, a series of computer intrusions occurred at a number of U.S. military installations. At first the military thought that this might be the start of an information warfare attack—a possibility the military had been discussing since the early 1990s. Over 500 domain name servers were compromised during the course of the attacks. Making it harder to track the actual origin of the attacks was the fact that the attackers made a number of “hops” between different systems, averaging eight different systems before arriving at the target. The attackers eventually turned out to be two teenagers from California and their mentor in Israel. The attacks, as it turned out, had nothing to do with the potential conflict in Iraq.

The Melissa Virus (March 1999)
Melissa is the best known of the early macro-type viruses that attach themselves to documents for programs that have limited macro programming capability. The virus, written and released by David Smith, infected about a million computers and caused an estimated $80 million in damages. Melissa, which clogged networks with the traffic it generated and caused problems for e-mail servers worldwide, was attached to Microsoft Word 97 and Word 2000 documents. If the user opened the file, the macro ran, infecting the current host and also sending itself to the first 50 addresses in the individual’s e-mail address book. The e-mail sent contained a subject line stating “Important Message From” and then included the name of the individual who was infected. The body of the e-mail message contained the text “Here is that document you asked for … don’t show anyone else ;-)”. The nature of both the subject line and
the body of the message usually generated enough user curiosity that many
people opened the document and thus infected their system, which in turn sent
the same message to 50 of their acquaintances. As a final action, if the minute
of the current hour when the macro was run matched the day of the month, the
macro inserted “Twenty-two points, plus triple-word-score, plus fifty points
for using all my letters. Game’s over. I’m outta here.” into the current docu-
ment. Smith, who plead guilty, was ultimately fined $5000 and sentenced to
20 months in jail for the incident. Because the macro code is easy to modify,
there have been many variations of the Melissa virus. Recipients could avoid
infection by Melissa simply by not opening the attached file.

The Love Letter Virus (May 2000)
Also known as the “ILOVEYOU” worm and the “Love Bug,” the Love Let-
ter virus was written and released by a Philippine student named Onel de
Guzman. The virus was spread via e-mail with the subject line of
“ILOVEYOU.” Estimates of the number of infected machines worldwide
have been as high as 45 million, accompanied by a possible $10 billion in
damages (it should be noted that figures like these are extremely hard to
verify or calculate). Similar to the Melissa virus, the Love Letter virus spread
via an e-mail attachment, but in this case, instead of utilizing macros, the at-
tachments were VBScript programs. When the receiver ran the attachment,
it searched the system for files with specific extensions in order to replace
them with copies of itself. It also sent itself to everyone in the user’s address
book. Again, since the receiver generally knew the sender, most individuals
opened the attachment without questioning it. de Guzman ultimately was
not convicted for releasing the worm because the Philippines, at the time,
did not have any laws denoting the activity as a crime. Again, recipients
avoided infection from the virus simply by not opening the attachments.

The Code Red Worm (2001)
On July 19, 2001, over 350,000 computers connected to the Internet were in-
fected by the Code Red worm. This infection took only 14 hours to occur.
The cost estimate for how much damage the worm caused (including varia-
tions of the worm released on later dates) exceeded $2.5 billion. The vulner-
ability exploited by the Code Red worm had been known for a month. The
worm took advantage of a buffer-overflow condition in Microsoft’s IIS web
servers. Microsoft released a patch for this vulnerability and made an offi-
cial announcement of the problem on June 18, 2001. The worm itself was
“memory resident,” so simply turning off an infected machine eliminated it.
Unfortunately, unless the system was patched before being reconnected to
the Internet, chances were good that it would soon become reinfected.
Though the worm didn’t carry a malicious payload designed to destroy data
on the infected system, on some systems, the message “Hacked by Chinese”
was added to the top-level page for the infected host’s web site. If the date
on the infected system was between the 1st and the 19th of the month, the
worm would try to infect a random list of IP addresses it generated. If
the date was between the 20th and the 28th of the month, the worm would
attempt to launch a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack against a web site owned by the White House. After the
28th, the worm would lay dormant until the 1st of the next month. This date
scheme actually ended up helping to eliminate the worm, because soon after it was released on the 19th, the worm stopped trying to infect systems. This provided a period of time when systems could be rebooted and patched before they were infected again.

**Adil Yahya Zakaria Shakour (August 2001–May 2002)**

On March 13, 2003, 19-year-old Adil Yahya Zakaria Shakour plead guilty to a variety of crimes, including unauthorized access to computer systems and credit card fraud. Shakour admitted to having accessed several computers without authorization, including a server at Eglin Air Force Base (where he defaced the web site), computers at Accenture (a Chicago-based management consulting and technology services company), a computer system at Sandia National Laboratories (a Department of Energy facility), and a computer at Cheaptaxforms.com. Shakour admitted to having obtained credit card and personal information during the break-in of Cheaptaxforms.com and having used it to purchase items worth over $7,000 for his own use. Shakour was sentenced to one year and one day in federal prison and a three-year term of supervised release, and was ordered to pay $88,000 in restitution.

**The Slammer Worm (2003)**

On Saturday, January 25, 2003, the Slammer worm (also sometimes referred to as the Slammer virus) was released. It exploited a buffer-overflow vulnerability in computers running Microsoft’s SQL Server or Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine. Like the vulnerability in Code Red, this weakness was not new and, in fact, had been discovered in July of 2002; Microsoft issued a patch for the vulnerability before it was even announced. Within the first 24 hours of Slammer’s release, the worm had infected at least 120,000 hosts and caused network outages and the disruption of airline flights, elections, and ATMs. At its peak, Slammer-infected hosts were generating a reported 1TB of worm-related traffic every second. The worm doubled its number of infected hosts every 8 seconds. It is estimated that it took less than ten minutes to reach global proportions and infect 90 percent of the possible hosts it could infect. Once a machine was infected, the host would start randomly selecting targets and sending packets to them to attempt infection at a rate of 25,000 packets per second. Slammer did not contain a malicious payload. The problems it caused were a result of the massively overloaded networks, which could not sustain the traffic being generated by the thousands of infected hosts. The worm sent its single packet to a specific UDP port, 1434, which provided an immediate fix to prevent further network access. Thus, the response of administrators was to quickly block all traffic to UDP port 1434, effectively curbing the spread of the worm to new machines.


In April 2009, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano told reporters that the United States was aware of attempts by both Russia and China to break into the U.S. electric power grid, map it out, and plant destructive programs that could be activated at a later date. She indicated that these attacks were not new and had in fact been going on for years. One article in the *Kansas City Star*, for example, reported that in 1997 the local power company, Kansas City
Power and Light, saw perhaps 10,000 attacks for the entire year. In contrast, in 2009 the company has been experiencing 10 to 20 attacks every second. While none of these attacks is credited with causing any significant loss of power, the attacks nonetheless highlight the fact that the nation’s critical infrastructures are viewed as potential targets by other nations. In the event of some future conflict, the United States could expect to experience a cyber attack on the cyber infrastructures that operate its critical systems.

Conficker (2008–2009)
In late 2008 and early 2009, security experts became alarmed when it was discovered that millions of systems attached to the Internet were infected with the Downadup worm. Also known as Conficker, the worm was first detected in November 2008 and was believed to have originated in Ukraine. Infected systems were not initially damaged beyond having their antivirus solution updates blocked. What alarmed experts was the fact that infected systems could be used in a secondary attack on other systems or networks. Each of these infected systems was part of what is known as a bot network and could be used to cause a DoS attack on a target or be used for the forwarding of spam e-mail to millions of users. It was widely believed that this network of subverted systems would be activated on April 1, 2009, and would result in the widespread loss of data and system connectivity. As it turned out, very little damage was done on that date, though millions of dollars were spent in responding to the millions of infected systems.

Fiber Cable Cut (2009)
On April 9, 2009, a widespread phone and Internet outage hit the San Jose area in California. This outage was not the result of a group of determined hackers gaining unauthorized access to the computers that operate these networks, but instead occurred as a result of several cuts in the physical cables that carry the signals. A cable being cut is not an unusual occurrence; backhoes have been responsible for many temporary interruptions in telephone service in the past decade. What was unusual, and significant, about this incident was that the cuts were deliberate. A manhole cover had been removed to allow the attacker(s) to gain access to the cables underground. The cuts resulted in a loss of all telephone, cell phone, and Internet service for thousands of users in the San Jose area. Emergency services such as 911 were also affected, which could have had severe consequences. What is important to take away from this incident is the fact that the infrastructures that our communities, states, and the nation rely on can also be easily attacked using fairly simple physical techniques and without a lot of technical expertise.

Try This
Software Patches
One of the most effective measures security professionals can take to address attacks on their computer systems and networks is to ensure that all software is up-to-date in terms of vendor-released patches. Many of the outbreaks of viruses and worms would have been much less severe if everybody had applied security updates and patches when they were released. For the operating system that you use, use your favorite web browser to find what patches exist for the operating system and what vulnerabilities or issues they were created to address.
Threats to Security

The incidents described in the previous section provide a glimpse into the many different threats that face administrators as they attempt to protect their computer systems and networks. There are, of course, the normal natural disasters that organizations have faced for years. In today’s highly networked world, however, new threats have developed that we did not have to worry about 50 years ago.

There are a number of ways that we can break down the various threats. One way to categorize them is to separate threats that come from outside of the organization from those that are internal. Another is to look at the various levels of sophistication of the attacks, from those by “script kiddies” to those by “elite hackers.” A third is to examine the level of organization of the various threats, from unstructured threats to highly structured threats. All of these are valid approaches, and they in fact overlap each other. The following sections examine threats from the perspective of where the attack comes from.

Viruses and Worms

While your organization may be exposed to viruses and worms as a result of employees not following certain practices or procedures, generally you will not have to worry about your employees writing or releasing viruses and worms. It is important to draw a distinction between the writers of malware and those who release them. Debates over the ethics of writing viruses permeate the industry, but currently, simply writing them is not considered a criminal activity. A virus is like a baseball bat; the bat itself is not evil, but the inappropriate use of the bat (such as to smash a car’s window) falls into the category of criminal activity. (Some may argue that this is not a very good analogy since a baseball bat has a useful purpose—to play ball—but viruses have no useful purpose. In general, this is true but in some limited environments, such as in specialized computer science courses, the study and creation of viruses can be considered a useful learning experience.)

By far, viruses and worms are the most common problem that an organization faces because literally thousands of them have been created and released. Fortunately, antivirus software and system patching can eliminate the largest portion of this threat. Viruses and worms generally are also non-discriminating threats; they are released on the Internet in a general fashion and aren’t targeted at a specific organization. They typically are also highly visible once released, so they aren’t the best tool to use in highly structured attacks where secrecy is vital. This is not to say that the technology used in virus and worm propagation won’t be used by highly organized criminal groups, but its use for what these individuals are normally interested in accomplishing is limited. The same cannot be said for terrorist organizations, which generally want to create a large impact and have it be highly visible.

Intruders

The act of deliberately accessing computer systems and networks without authorization is generally referred to as hacking, with individuals who conduct this activity being referred to as hackers. The term hacking also applies to the act of exceeding one’s authority in a system. This would include...
authorized users who attempt to gain access to files they aren’t permitted to access or who attempt to obtain permissions that they have not been granted. While the act of breaking into computer systems and networks has been glorified in the media and movies, the physical act does not live up to the Hollywood hype. Intruders are, if nothing else, extremely patient, since the process to gain access to a system takes persistence and dogged determination. The attacker will conduct many preattack activities in order to obtain the information needed to determine which attack will most likely be successful. Generally, by the time an attack is launched, the attacker will have gathered enough information to be very confident that the attack will succeed. If it doesn’t, the attacker will gather additional information and take a different approach (though launching the first attack may alert security personnel). Generally, attacks by an individual or even a small group of attackers fall into the unstructured threat category. Attacks at this level generally are conducted over short periods of time (lasting at most a few months), do not involve a large number of individuals, have little financial backing, and are accomplished by insiders or outsiders who do not seek collusion with insiders.

Intruders, or those who are attempting to conduct an intrusion, definitely come in many different varieties and have varying degrees of sophistication (see Figure 1.1). At the low end technically are what are generally referred to as script kiddies, individuals who do not have the technical expertise to develop scripts or discover new vulnerabilities in software but who have just enough understanding of computer systems to be able to download and run scripts that others have developed. These individuals generally are not interested in attacking specific targets, but instead simply want to find any organization that may not have patched a newly discovered vulnerability for which the script kiddie has located a script to exploit the vulnerability. It is hard to estimate how many of the individuals performing activities such as probing networks or scanning individual systems are part of this group, but it is undoubtedly the fastest growing group and the vast majority of the “unfriendly” activity occurring on the Internet is probably carried out by these individuals.

At the next level are those people who are capable of writing scripts to exploit known vulnerabilities. These individuals are much more technically competent than script kiddies and account for an estimated 8 to 12 percent of malicious Internet activity. At the top end of this spectrum are those highly technical individuals, often referred to as elite hackers, who not only have the ability to write scripts that exploit vulnerabilities but also are capable of discovering new vulnerabilities. This group is the smallest of the lot, however, and is responsible for, at most, only 1 to 2 percent of intrusive activity.

Insiders

It is generally acknowledged by security professionals that insiders are more dangerous in many respects than outside intruders. The reason for this is simple—insiders have the access and knowledge necessary to cause immediate damage to an organization. Most security is designed to protect
against outside intruders and thus lies at the boundary between the organi-
zation and the rest of the world. Insiders may actually already have all the
access they need to perpetrate criminal activity such as fraud. In addition to
unprecedented access, insiders also frequently have knowledge of the secu-
rity systems in place and are better able to avoid detection. Attacks by insid-
ers are often the result of employees who have become disgruntled with
their organization and are looking for ways to disrupt operations. It is also
possible that an “attack” by an insider may be an accident and not intended
as an attack at all. An example of this might be an employee who deletes a
critical file without understanding its critical nature.

Employees are not the only insiders that organizations need to be con-
cerned about. Often, numerous other individuals have physical access to
company facilities. Custodial crews frequently have unescorted access
throughout the facility, often when nobody else is around. Other individu-
als, such as contractors or partners, may have not only physical access to the
organization’s facilities but also access to computer systems and networks.

Criminal Organizations

As businesses became increasingly reliant upon computer systems and net-
works, and as the amount of financial transactions conducted via the
Internet increased, it was inevitable that criminal organizations would
eventually turn to the electronic world as a new target to exploit. Criminal
activity on the Internet at its most basic is no different from criminal activity
in the physical world. Fraud, extortion, theft, embezzlement, and forgery all
take place in the electronic environment.

One difference between criminal groups and the “average” hacker is the
level of organization that criminal elements employ in their attack. Criminal
groups typically have more money to spend on accomplishing the criminal
activity and are willing to spend extra time accomplishing the task provided
the level of reward at the conclusion is great enough. With the tremendous
amount of money that is exchanged via the Internet on a daily basis, the
level of reward for a successful attack is high enough to interest criminal ele-
ments. Attacks by criminal organizations usually fall into the structured
threat category, which is characterized by a greater amount of planning, a
longer period of time to conduct the activity, more financial backing to ac-
complish it, and possibly corruption of, or collusion with, insiders.

Terrorists and Information Warfare

As nations have increasingly become dependent on computer systems and
networks, the possibility that these essential elements of society might be
targeted by organizations or nations determined to adversely affect another
nation has become a reality. Many nations today have developed to some
extent the capability to conduct information warfare. There are several defi-
nitions for information warfare, but a simple one is that it is warfare con-
ducted against the information and information processing equipment used
by an adversary. In practice, this is a much more complicated subject, be-
cause information not only may be the target of an adversary, but also may
be used as a weapon. Whatever definition you use, information warfare falls
into the highly structured threat category. This type of threat is characterized
by a much longer period of preparation (years is not uncommon),
tremendous financial backing, and a large and organized group of attackers. The threat may include attempts not only to subvert insiders but also to plant individuals inside of a potential target in advance of a planned attack.

An interesting aspect of information warfare is the list of possible targets available. We have grown accustomed to the idea that, during war, military forces will target opposing military forces but will generally attempt to destroy as little civilian infrastructure as possible. In information warfare, military forces are certainly still a key target, but much has been written about other targets, such as the various infrastructures that a nation relies on for its daily existence. Water, electricity, oil and gas refineries and distribution, banking and finance, telecommunications—all fall into the category of critical infrastructures for a nation. Critical infrastructures are those whose loss would have severe repercussions on the nation. With countries relying so heavily on these infrastructures, it is inevitable that they will be viewed as valid targets during conflict. Given how dependent these infrastructures are on computer systems and networks, it is also inevitable that these same computer systems and networks will be targeted for a cyber attack in an information war.

Another interesting aspect of information warfare is the potential list of attackers. As mentioned, several countries are currently capable of conducting this type of warfare. Nations, however, are not the only ones that can conduct information, or cyber, warfare. Terrorist organizations can also accomplish this. Such groups fall into the category of highly structured threats since they too are willing to conduct long-term operations, have (in some cases) tremendous financial support, and often have a large following. Reports out of Afghanistan related stories of soldiers and intelligence officers finding laptop computers formerly owned by members of al-Qaeda that contained information about various critical infrastructures in the United States. This showed that terrorist organizations not only were targeting such infrastructures, but were doing so at an unexpected level of sophistication.

Security Trends

The biggest change that has occurred in security over the last 30 years has been the change in the computing environment from large mainframes to a highly interconnected network of much smaller systems (smaller is a relative term here because the computing power of desktop computers exceeds the power of many large mainframes of 30 years ago). What this has meant for security is a switch from an environment in which everything was fairly contained and people operated in a closed environment to one in which access to a computer can occur from almost anywhere on the planet. This has, for obvious reasons, greatly complicated the job of the security professional.

The type of individual who attacks a computer system or network has also evolved over the last 30 years. There was, of course, the traditional intelligence service operator paid by a particular country to obtain secrets from other government computer systems. These people still exist. What has increased dramatically is the number of nonaffiliated intruders. As discussed earlier, the rise of the “script kiddie” has greatly multiplied the number of individuals who probe organizations looking for vulnerabilities to exploit. This is actually the result of another recent trend: as the level of sophistication of attacks has increased, the level of knowledge necessary to...
exploit vulnerabilities has decreased. This is due to the number of automated tools that have been created that allow even novice attackers to exploit highly technical and complex vulnerabilities. The resulting increase in network attacks has been reflected in a number of different studies conducted by various organizations in the industry.

One of the best-known security surveys is the joint survey conducted annually by the Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the FBI (this survey, CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey, can be obtained from www.gocsi.com). The respondents, who normally number over 500 individuals, come from all walks of life: government, academia, and industry. Over the last several years, the percentage of organizations that have experienced security incidents has slowly declined (from 46 percent in 2007 to 43 percent in 2008). This decline has been seen in the most frequent type of incidents experienced (viruses, insider abuse, laptop theft, and unauthorized access) which have remained the same for the last four years. Only four types of attacks showed any increase from 2007 to 2008 (unauthorized access, theft/loss of proprietary information, misuse of web applications, and DNS attacks).

One of the most interesting and oft-repeated statistics from the survey is the average loss experienced by organizations due to specific types of security incidents. The average loss as a result of theft of proprietary information, for example, hit a high of $6.57 million in 2002 but was only $2.70 million in 2003 before rising to $6.03 million in 2006 and then dropping to $6.57 million in 2007. Financial fraud plunged from $4.63 million in 2002 to $328,000 in 2003 before rising to $2.56 million in 2006 and then skyrocketing to $21.12 million in 2007. While it is tempting to assume that this means we, as a community, are becoming more secure (and there is indeed some indication that organizations are doing a better job of securing their systems), the reality is that these figures reflect the difficulty in quantifying the actual state of Internet security and of producing accurate results. While we all like to use figures such as those from the CSI/FBI survey, the truth of the matter is that these numbers likely don’t accurately portray the state of current security. They are, however, the most reliable ones we have.

**Avenues of Attack**

There are two general reasons a particular computer system is attacked: either it is specifically targeted by the attacker, or it is an opportunistic target. In the first case, the attacker has chosen the target not because of the hardware or software the organization is running but for another reason, perhaps a political reason. An example of this type of attack would be an individual in one country attacking a government system in another. Alternatively, the attacker may be targeting the organization as part of a hacktivist attack. An example, in this case, might be an attacker who defaces the web site of a company that sells fur coats because the attacker feels that using animals in this way is unethical. Perpetrating some sort of electronic fraud is another reason a specific system might be targeted. Whatever the reason, an attack of this nature is decided upon before the attacker knows what hardware and software the organization has.
The second type of attack, an attack against a target of opportunity, is conducted against a site that has software that is vulnerable to a specific exploit. The attackers, in this case, are not targeting the organization; instead, they have learned of a vulnerability and are simply looking for an organization with this vulnerability that they can exploit. This is not to say that an attacker might not be targeting a given sector and looking for a target of opportunity in that sector, however. For example, an attacker may desire to obtain credit card or other personal information and may search for any exploitable company with credit card information in order to carry out the attack.

Targeted attacks are more difficult and take more time than attacks on a target of opportunity. The latter simply relies on the fact that with any piece of widely distributed software, there will almost always be somebody who has not patched the system (or has not patched it properly) as they should have.

The Steps in an Attack

The steps an attacker takes in attempting to penetrate a targeted network are similar to the ones that a security consultant performing a penetration test would take. First, the attacker gathers as much information about the organization as possible. There are numerous ways to do this, including studying the organization’s own web site, looking for postings on newsgroups, or consulting resources such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR web site (www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). A number of different financial reports are available through the EDGAR web site that can provide information about an organization that is useful for an attack—particularly a social engineering attack. The type of information that the attacker wants includes IP addresses, phone numbers, names of individuals, and what networks the organization maintains. This step is known as “profiling” or “reconnaissance.” Commands such as `whois` are useful in this step for obtaining information on IP blocks and DNS server addresses. An even more common tool that is useful in gathering data is a traditional web search engine such as Google.

Typically, the next step, which is the first step in the technical part of an attack, is to determine what target systems are available and active. This step moves us from profiling to actual scanning and is accomplished with methods such as a `ping sweep`, which simply sends a “ping” (an ICMP echo request) to the target machine. If the machine responds, it is reachable. The next step is often to perform a `port scan`. This will help identify which ports are open, thus giving an indication of which services may be running on the target machine. Determining the operating system (known as `OS fingerprinting`) that is running on the target machine, as well as specific application programs, follows, along with determining the
services that are available (which can be accomplished by banner grabbing). Various techniques can be used to send specifically formatted packets to the ports on a target system to view the response. Often this response provides clues as to which operating system and specific applications are running on the target system. Once this is done, the attacker would have a list of possible target machines, the operating system running on them, and some specific applications or services to target.

Up until this point, the attacker has simply been gathering the information needed to discover potential vulnerabilities that may be exploited. Further research is conducted to find possible vulnerabilities and once a list of these is developed, the attacker is ready to take the next step: an actual attack on the target. Knowing the operating system and services on the target helps the attacker decide which tools to use in the attack.

Numerous web sites provide information on the vulnerabilities of specific application programs and operating systems. This information is valuable to administrators, since they need to know what problems exist and how to patch them. In addition to information about specific vulnerabilities, some sites may also provide tools that can be used to exploit the vulnerabilities. An attacker can search for known vulnerabilities and tools that exploit them, download the information and tools, and then use them against a site. If the administrator for the targeted system has not installed the correct patch, the attack may be successful; if the patch has been installed, the attacker will move on to the next possible vulnerability. If the administrator has installed all of the appropriate patches so that all known vulnerabilities have been addressed, the attacker may have to resort to a brute-force attack, which involves guessing a user ID and password combination. Unfortunately, this type of attack, which could be easily prevented, sometimes proves successful.

This discussion of the steps in an attack is by no means complete. There are many different ways a system can be attacked. This, however, is the general process: gathering as much information about the target as possible (using both electronic and nonelectronic means), gathering information about possible exploits based on the information about the system, and then systematically attempting to use each exploit. If the exploits don’t work, other, less system-specific attacks may be attempted.

### Minimizing Possible Avenues of Attack

Understanding the steps an attacker will take enables you to limit the exposure of your system and minimize those avenues an attacker might possibly exploit.

The first step an administrator can take to reduce possible attacks is to ensure that all patches for the operating system and applications are installed. Many security problems that we read about, such as viruses and worms, exploit known vulnerabilities for which patches exist. The reason such malware caused so much damage in the past was that administrators did not take the appropriate actions to protect their systems.

The second step an administrator can take is system hardening, which involves limiting the services that are running on the system. Only using those services that are absolutely needed does two things: it limits the possible avenues of attack (those services with vulnerabilities that can be
exploited), and it reduces the number of services the administrator has to worry about patching in the first place. This is one of the important first steps any administrator should take to secure a computer system.

Another strategy to minimize possible avenues of attack is to provide as little information as possible about your organization and its computing resources on publicly available places (such as web sites). Since the attacker is after information, don’t make it easy to obtain. For example, at one time it was not uncommon for organizations to list the type of OS or browser used on login banners but, as has been discussed, this gives a potential attacker information that can be used to select possible attacks. In addition, consider what contact information is absolutely necessary to have displayed on publicly available sites.

**Types of Attacks**

There are a number of ways that a computer system or network can be attacked (this topic will be covered in greater detail in Chapter 15). If successful, the attack may produce one of the following: a loss of confidentiality, if information is disclosed to individuals not authorized to see it; a loss of integrity, if information is modified by individuals not authorized to change it; or a loss of availability, if information or the systems processing it are not available for use by authorized users when they need the information.
Chapter 1 Review

- **Chapter Summary**
  After reading this chapter and completing the quizzes, you should understand the following regarding security trends.

  **List and Discuss Recent Trends in Computer Security**
  - Fifty years ago, few people had access to a computer system or network, so securing them was a relatively easy matter.
  - There are many different ways to attack computers and networks to take advantage of what has made shopping, banking, investment, and leisure pursuits a simple matter of “dragging and clicking” for many people.
  - The biggest change that has occurred in security over the last 30 years has been the change in the computing environment from large mainframes to a highly interconnected network of much smaller systems.

  **Describe Simple Steps to Take to Minimize the Possibility of an Attack on a System**
  - The steps an attacker takes in attempting to penetrate a targeted network are similar to the ones that a security consultant performing a penetration test would take.
  - A ping sweep simply sends a “ping” (an ICMP echo request) to the target machine.
  - A port scan will help identify which ports are open, thus giving an indication of which services may be running on the targeted machine.
  - Numerous web sites exist that provide information on vulnerabilities in specific application programs and operating systems.
  - The first step an administrator can take to minimize possible attacks is to ensure that all patches for the operating system and applications are installed.

  **Describe Various Types of Threats That Exist for Computers and Networks**
  - There are a number of different threats to security, including viruses and worms, intruders, insiders, criminal organizations, terrorists, and information warfare conducted by foreign countries.
  - There are two general reasons a particular computer system is attacked: it is specifically targeted by the attacker, or it is a target of opportunity.
  - Targeted attacks are more difficult and take more time than attacks on a target of opportunity.

  **Discuss Recent Computer Crimes That Have Been Committed**
  - The different types of electronic crime fall into two main categories: crimes in which the computer was the target of the attack, and incidents in which the computer was a means of perpetrating a criminal act.
  - One significant trend observed over the last several years has been the increase in the number of computer attacks.
Key Terms

- critical infrastructures (10)
- elite hackers (8)
- hacking (7)
- hacktivist (11)
- highly structured threat (9)
- information warfare (9)
- ping sweep (9)
- port scan (12)
- script kiddies (8)
- structured threat (9)
- unstructured threat (8)

Key Terms Quiz

Use terms from the Key Terms list to complete the sentences that follow. Don’t use the same term more than once. Not all terms will be used.

1. A(n) _______________ is a threat characterized by a greater amount of planning, a longer period of time to conduct the activity, more financial backing to accomplish it, and the possible corruption of, or collusion with, insiders.

2. A hacker whose activities are motivated by a personal cause or position is known as a _______________.

3. Infrastructures whose loss would have a severe detrimental impact on the nation are called _______________.

4. _______________ is warfare conducted against the information and information processing equipment used by an adversary.

5. A _______________ simply sends a “ping” (an ICMP echo request) to the target machine.

6. A(n) _______________ is a threat that generally is short-term in nature, does not involve a large group of individuals, does not have large financial backing, and does not include collusion with insiders.

7. _______________ are the most technically competent individuals conducting intrusive activity on the Internet. They not only can exploit known vulnerabilities but are usually the ones responsible for finding those vulnerabilities.

8. A _______________ helps identify which ports are open, thus giving an indication of which services may be running on the targeted machine.

9. _______________ are individuals who do not have the technical expertise to develop scripts or discover new vulnerabilities in software but who have just enough understanding of computer systems to be able to download and run scripts that others have developed.

10. A(n) _______________ is a threat characterized by attacks that are conducted over short periods of time (lasting at most a few months), that do not involve a large number of individuals, that have little financial backing, and are accomplished by insiders or outsiders who do not seek collusion with insiders.
Multiple-Choice Quiz

1. Which threats are characterized by possibly long periods of preparation (years is not uncommon), tremendous financial backing, a large and organized group of attackers, and attempts to subvert insiders or to plant individuals inside a potential target in advance of a planned attack?
   A. Unstructured threats
   B. Structured threats
   C. Highly structured threats
   D. Nation-state information warfare threats

2. Which of the following is an attempt to find and attack a site that has hardware or software that is vulnerable to a specific exploit?
   A. Target of opportunity attack
   B. Targeted attack
   C. Vulnerability scan attack
   D. Information warfare attack

3. Which of the following threats has not grown over the last decade as a result of increasing numbers of Internet users?
   A. Viruses
   B. Hackers
   C. Denial-of-service attacks
   D. All of these have seen an increase over the last decade.

4. The rise of which of the following has greatly increased the number of individuals who probe organizations looking for vulnerabilities to exploit?
   A. Virus writers
   B. Script kiddies
   C. Hackers
   D. Elite hackers

5. Which of the following is generally viewed as the first Internet worm to have caused significant damage and to have “brought the Internet down”?
   A. Melissa
   B. The “Love Bug”
   C. The Morris worm
   D. Code Red

6. Which of the following individuals was convicted of various computer crimes and was known for his ability to conduct successful social engineering attacks?
   A. Kevin Mitnick
   B. Vladimir Levin
   C. Timothy Lloyd
   D. David Smith

7. According to the CSI/FBI survey, which of the following statistics decreased in 2003?
   A. The number of organizations reporting the Internet as a point of attack
   B. The number of organizations that have reported unauthorized use of their systems
   C. The average loss as a result of theft of proprietary information
   D. Both B and C

8. Which virus/worm was credited with reaching global proportions in less than ten minutes?
   A. Code Red
   B. The Morris worm
   C. Melissa
   D. Slammer
9. The act of deliberately accessing computer systems and networks without authorization is generally known as:
   A. Computer intrusions
   B. Hacking
   C. Cracking
   D. Probing

10. What is the most common problem/threat an organization faces?
    A. Viruses/worms
    B. Script kiddies
    C. Hackers
    D. Hacktivists

11. Warfare conducted against the information and information processing equipment used by an adversary is known as:
    A. Hacking
    B. Cyber terrorism
    C. Information warfare
    D. Network warfare

12. An attacker who feels that using animals to make fur coats is unethical and thus defaces the website of a company that sells fur coats is an example of:
    A. Information warfare
    B. Hacktivism
    C. Cyber crusading
    D. Elite hacking

13. Which of the following is not described as a critical infrastructure?
    A. Electricity (power)
    B. Banking and finance
    C. Telecommunications
    D. Retail stores

14. Criminal organizations would normally be classified as what type of threat?
    A. Unstructured
    B. Unstructured but hostile
    C. Structured
    D. Highly structured

15. Elite hackers don’t account for more than what percentage of the total number of individuals conducting intrusive activity on the Internet?
    A. 1–2 percent
    B. 3–5 percent
    C. 7–10 percent
    D. 15–20 percent

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**Essay Quiz**

1. Reread the various examples of computer crimes at the beginning of this chapter. Categorize each as either a crime where the computer was the target of the criminal activity or a crime in which the computer was a tool in accomplishing the criminal activity.

2. Your boss has just heard about some “nefarious computer activities” called ping sweeps and port scans. He wants to know more about them and what the impact might be of these activities on your company. Write a brief description of what they are and include your assessment of whether this activity is something to worry about or not.

3. A friend of yours has just been hired by an organization as their computer security officer. Your friend is a bit nervous about this new job and has come to you, knowing that you are taking a computer security class, to ask your advice on measures that can be taken that might help prevent an intrusion. What three things can you suggest that are simple but can tremendously help limit the possibility of an attack?

4. Discuss why insiders are considered such a threat to organizations?

5. Write a brief essay outlining what you learned from the CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey mentioned in the chapter.
Lab Projects

• **Lab Project 1.1**

A number of different examples of computer crimes were discussed in this chapter. Similar activities seem to happen daily. Do a search on the Internet to see what other examples you can find. Try and obtain the most recent examples possible.

• **Lab Project 1.2**

References to "script kiddies" were made frequently in this chapter. The implication was that it is easy today to perform certain types of activities because it is easy to find tools that allow you to perform them. If allowed at your school or by your ISP, perform a search of the Internet to see how easy it is to locate programs that will perform activities such as ping sweeps and port scans. What other types of security-related tools can you find?